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SUBJECT: ABBE MALUMALU REVIEWS KEY AMANI PROGRAM CHALLENGES
AND ELEMENTS

REF: A. KINSHASA 240 AND PREVIOUS
[1](#)B. KINSHASA 238

[1](#)1. (SBU) Summary. National Coordinator Abbe Malumalu discussed challenges to and key elements of the Amani Program with the Ambassador March 18. Its chief current challenges are armed group participation, planning and program infrastructure. Malumalu envisions a program focused on military reforms, humanitarian issues and roads and infrastructure. Once the program is up and running, he plans to divide his time in Goma and Bukavu with frequent visits outside the capitals to raise public awareness of and support for it. It appears that he aims for the program to do nothing less than to re-establish state authority and services after the government's failure so far to do so. End summary.

[1](#)2. (U) National Coordinator Abbe Muhongulu Malumalu discussed his plans for implementing the January 23 Goma accords with the Ambassador March 18. Abbe Malumalu focused on three major challenges to and three key elements of what is officially called the National Program for Security, Peace, Stabilization and Reconstruction for North Kivu and South Kivu, but generally referred to as the "Amani" (Swahili for peace) program. He and the Ambassador also reviewed issues relating to the expected structure of the program. Malumalu aide Flavion Misoni, PolCouns and PolOff sat in.

Three major challenges

[1](#)3. (SBU) Participation: For Abbe Malumalu, keeping all the armed groups that signed the Goma accords involved in the process has been the major challenge to date. He was clearly referring to the dynamics of recent negotiations with CNDP and Pareco as well as the smaller Mai-Mai groups (ref A). He noted that all did not have the same importance but all had to be included. He said that leaving the smaller groups outside the process would leave them susceptible to recruitment by the FDLR. By contrast, treating all groups equally detracts from players whose participation is crucial. He emphasized in particular the importance of keeping CNDP and the South Kivu Banyamulenge FRF inside the process, and cited U.S. involvement as a key factor in ensuring that CNDP in particular remained involved.

[1](#)4. (SBU) Planning: Abbe Malumalu described planning for the program as perhaps the most important issue it currently faces. He hoped by early April at the latest to have in place a team of Congolese and international experts working together on a plan to address solutions for specific challenges and problems. He said it was not clear if the

government currently had the interest or financial resources to provide experts. He expressed hope that donors could help out in this area, citing USAID's funding of technical experts for the electoral commission.

15. (SBU) Program infrastructure: Abbe Malumalu cited program infrastructure and equipment as the program's third current challenge. He is aiming to have the program operational from the beginning of April in Kinshasa, Goma and Bukavu. He said he had finalized arrangements to rent buildings in Goma and Bukavu, and was looking for office space in Kinshasa. He said the program had already begun using equipment and supplies provided by USAID contractor DAI from the January conference in Goma. He called for a tour d'horizon with donors in the near future to determine contributions in specific areas.

Three key elements

16. (SBU) Abbe Malumulu indicated the Amani program would incorporate a wide range of elements, including military reform, police training, roads and infrastructure, a public awareness ("sensibilization") campaign, and leadership training such as that conducted by Woodrow Wilson Institute partner ILLCE. He cited the importance of specific projects to focus common efforts. He described MONUC as a key partner, and its stabilization plan as the program's strongest support.

17. (SBU) Military: Abbe Malumalu cited the limited window of opportunity for military reform provided by MONUC's presence in the country. He stressed the importance of installing the

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FARDC in permanent camps, and said it could not be done without MONUC support. He also emphasized the importance of de-tribalizing the army in North and South Kivu. He said no more than 30 per cent of each battalion should be drawn from troops from the province in which they are stationed.

18. (SBU) He said he would present a plan for permanent camps by the end of the year encompassing North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema and northern Katanga. The plan would include microprojects in agriculture and stock raising, primary schools and military canteens as secondary benefits aimed at supplementing soldiers' salaries and accommodating their families. He described the process in two stages: first, obtaining tents for temporary accommodation and facilities; second, providing the means and materials for soldiers to construct their own camps.

19. (SBU) Humanitarian issues: Abbe Malumalu said that prospects for the return of refugees and IDPs would depend on the success of the plan's military element. In short, IDPs will return when police replace the FARDC. He said at that point the program could begin focusing on such humanitarian and rehabilitation issues as schools, agriculture and services.

110. (SBU) Roads and infrastructure: Abbe Malumalu cited the importance of restoring the region's damaged and neglected infrastructure. He had previously discussed with CNDP's Nkunda a plan put together by his experts for North Kivu roads (ref B). He cited USAID's experience in this area. In Butembo, for example, DAI provided small stipends for engineers and materials for a project enabling Congolese workers to construct six bridges and 42 fish ponds in three months.

New structures

111. (SBU) Abbe Malumalu and the Ambassador exchanged views on the structure and functions of the various commissions expected to be established in a series of forthcoming

presidential decrees. Abbe Malumalu noted that two earlier decrees had established the program's national and interprovincial structures, and the new text would do the same at on the provincial level. (Note: On March 24, the government issued six decrees signed March 20 by President Kabila and Prime Minister Gizenga finalizing the structure of the Amani program and naming members to fill national, interprovincial and provincial positions. End note.)

¶12. (SBU) He told the Ambassador he had presented his proposals to Kabila chief of staff Raymond Tshibanda, who was responsible for drafting the text. Once the program was up and running, he said he would be dividing his time between meetings in Goma and Bukavu and missions in the provinces to raise public awareness of the program with the population and hear their opinions. He noted that his ongoing responsibilities as head of the Independent Electoral Commission would also require him to make periodic visits to Kinshasa.

Comment

¶13. (SBU) Abbe Malumalu's plan appears to aim at nothing less than the re-establishment of state presence and services in North and South Kivu. Ironically, this is the same task that the government has failed so far to achieve in the 17 months since elections. End comment.

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